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Abstract
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Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4453
A recent study of house price behavior in U.S. cities 
by Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2006) raises questions 
about so-called superstar cities in which housing is so 
inelastically supplied that it becomes unaffordable, as 
higher-income families outbid residents.  The authors 
consider the case of Accra, Ghana, in this light, 
estimating the elasticity of housing supply and discussing 
the implications for growth and income distribution. 
   There is not a great deal of data available to examine 
trends in Accra, so the authors’  method is indirect.  First, 
they use a variant of the traditional monocentric city 
model to calculate the elasticity of Accra’s housing supply 
relative to those of other similarly-sized African cities.  
This suggests that housing supply responsiveness is much 
higher elsewhere.  This muted supply responsiveness 
is consistent with the observed higher housing prices.
This paper—a product of the Urban Division, Finance, Economics, and Urban Department (FEU)—is part of a larger effort 
in the department to look at housing problems in developing countries. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted 
on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at rbuckley@worldbank.org and amathema@
worldbank.org. 
Second, they  estimate a number of traditional housing 
demand equations and reduced form equations.  Placing 
a number of restrictions on the equations allows us to 
infer Accra’s housing supply elasticity.  
   Taken together, our approaches suggest that lower-
income families in Accra have such poor housing 
conditions because the market is extremely unresponsive 
to demand.  Although the outcomes the authors have 
traced—high housing prices and low quality—are 
not unusual relative to the other developed country 
superstar cities, they are extreme.  The welfare costs 
are considerable, so much so that in addition to direct 
housing market effects, these policies also appear to have 
potentially significant implications for the achievement of 
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I. Introduction 
Over the past 15 years Ghana has been one of the most rapidly growing 
economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. This growth has been aided immeasurably by Ghana 
experiencing high levels of remittances, which while difficult to measure undoubtedly 
exceed development aid and foreign direct investment.
1 These remittances, in turn, have 
been driven by the country’s benign and improving policy environment—one in which 
the average rate of inflation fell from among the highest in Africa to about 10 percent 
over the last few years—and the relatively large diaspora of Ghanaians who live abroad.
2  
While statistics on how these remittances are invested are not available, a number of 
articles (Quartey 2006, Yeboah 2000, and Diko and Tipple 1991), a drive around Accra, 
and discussions with bankers and developers there, as well as local newspaper accounts, 
all indicate that real estate investments in the capital city account for a significant share 
of the high level of gross domestic product received in remittances.
3  
At the same time, housing in Accra has become more expensive, and appears to 
be increasingly pricing middle- and lower-income groups out of the housing market, 
resulting in substandard and congested living conditions for a large majority of the city’s 
 
1 Ghana’s remittances, according to Addison (2004), in a Bank of Ghana study, increased sharply over the 
past 10 years. Remittances are defined as that portion of migrants’ earnings sent from the migration 
destination to the place of origin. As typically measured, and as is done in the aforementioned study, 
“remittances” refer to monetary and other cash transfers by migrant workers to their families and 
communities back home. Such estimates are of course difficult to measure, but as Quartey (2006) indicates, 
could well be underestimates. As the OECD (2006) shows this is the fourth largest share of remittances in 
the world for countries with populations in excess of 5 million.    
2 Ghana’s average annual inflation rate for the 1980s was 47 percent, almost three times the Sub-Saharan 
rate of less than 16 percent. For the 1990s, it was close to 30 percent. Estimates of Ghana’s diaspora range 
from 10 to 20 percent of its population. Adams and Page (2003) show the importance of macro conditions 
and the size of the diaspora as important determinants of the amount of remittances.  
3 See the Statesman article on housing in Accra (Jan. 22, 2007). On the use of remittances in Ghana, see 
Adams (2006) and Quartey and Blankson (2004). They both detail the generally pro-poor disposition of 
remittances, and the uses to which the funds are put.  In the former case, they show that remittances 
account for more than 20 percent of the expenditures of the lowest income quintile. However, both 
estimates are from a time, the latest year being 1998-99, when remittances were a small fraction of the level 
achieved in recent years. In addition, they are nationwide figures. Quartey (2006) suggests that housing 
investments are an important use of remittances.      2
                                                
residents. This pattern suggests a number of possible mysteries: First, given the high and 
growing level of investments in Accra’s real estate, why is it the case that the housing 
conditions of the poor in Accra are considerably worse than those of the poor in a number 
of other African cities which have lower incomes, as shown both by Konadu-Agymang 
(1990) and our data? And second, is this pattern is similar to that observed in the U.S. 
cities, referred to as “Superstar Cities,” by Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2006), in which 
the growth in the number of higher-income families in cities with inelastic housing 
supply results in these families outbidding lower-income families, driving up the price of 
the underlying land?  Finally, are these mysteries related? That is, could Accra’s real 
estate boom lead to both deteriorating housing conditions for many, as well as have 
broader adverse effects on the economy? 
While this last question is perhaps the most intractable, it is also the most 
important as the situation in Accra is by no means an isolated case. Rapid house price 
escalation has characterized many cities across the world besides Accra, and particularly 
cities in emerging economies that have achieved higher levels of growth, such as India, 
China, and the EU-accession countries among others.
4   
This paper attempts to shed some light on these mysteries. It examines the effects 
policies have on house prices in Accra, showing how these factors adversely affect not 
only house prices but also the housing situation of the poor and the broader economy. 
 
4 Konadu-Agyemang (1998) traces through the sharp increases in real house prices in Accra since 1980.  
House prices in India are similarly interesting in terms of external finance, in this case foreign direct 
investments. In 2005, foreigners were for the first time allowed to invest in Indian real estate. During the 
next year, housing prices in most major Indian cities skyrocketed, leading the Reserve Bank of India to 
undertake a study, by Joshi (2006), of whether there was a bubble in housing prices in the country. Of 
course there is an important issue of fungibility of funds that make it extremely difficult to infer how 
remittances are ultimately used. For instance, unlike most of the earlier literature, Chami et al. (2005) 
suggest that remittances may well have a negative effect on growth. We do not focus on such macro-
balance questions. Our focus is on the distributional effects of relative price changes and the effects these 
changes can have on the ability to reallocate resources across space.  
   3
                                                
Before discussing our results, however, it is perhaps important to note the limitations of 
data availability and our corresponding efforts to place the limited data we have into what 
we hope are theoretically rich but simultaneously simple empirical constructs. To this 
end, in our analysis of the housing market we draw on two rich traditions: First, we rely 
on models of monocentric cities, about which Mills and Tan (1980, 314) said: 
There are few cases in economics in which such a simple theory leads to so many 
testable implications… [and which is] based on a functional form that can be 
derived from respectable theory and tested with easily available data.   
 
Second, we rely on development economics more generally, particularly with regard to 
perspectives on the role played by the housing market in economic growth. In particular, 
we take as a point of departure the view of Nobel Laureate W. Arthur Lewis (1977, pp. 
39-40): 
Urbanization is decisive because it is so expensive. The difference between the 
cost of urban and rural development does not turn on comparing the capital 
required for factories and that required for farms. Each of these is a small part of 
total investment, and the difference per head is not always in favor of industry. 
 
Thus, while we would not put a great deal of confidence in the statistical 
significance of our empirical results and their coefficients, we nevertheless believe that 
our findings are fairly clear and consistent with the literature on development and even 
Ghana’s development agenda, as propounded by Lewis (1954) in his theory of economic 
development.
5  
Our results are first, that the welfare costs of current sectoral policies are both 
considerable and regressive; and second, that these policies prevent housing demand 
increases—as might arise from remittances or improved access to finance—from 
 
5 Lewis won the Nobel Prize for his work on development economics. A significant part of this work was 
undertaken in Ghana’s early years of independence where he was the chief economic advisor to Kwame 
Nkrumah, Ghana’s first Prime Minister. See Tignor’s (2005) biography of Lewis for a discussion of the 
development of his theory and his arguments with Nkrumah.     4
                                                
contributing as much to growth as they could if they were not fueling asset price 
increases. In other words, housing market constraints appear to feed larger price increases 
because of sectoral policies which constrain the housing market.
6  
This paper is organized as follows: Section II  presents a background on Accra’s 
economy and growth trends, and relates it to primary data collected in the low income 
neighborhoods of Accra and a number of other similarly characterized African cities 
(Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and Dar es Salaam). We use an equation based on a mono-centric 
city model that allows broad inferences to be drawn about how elastic a specific city’s 
housing supply curve is relative to other cities, as well as how various policies and 
natural conditions—such as whether the city is bounded by a coast or not—might affect 
this elasticity. The main implication of the supply elasticities inferred from this model is 
that Accra’s housing supply elasticity is almost one-seventh that of Dar es Salaam’s, 
about a third of Addis Ababa’s, and less than half of Nairobi’s.  
To develop our empirical evidence further, we follow the approach used by 
Malpezzi and Mayo (1997) to infer the supply elasticity implied by a reduced form 
equation of housing market behavior in the four cities. For the limited number of 
observations we have, the results are remarkably robust, and support our basic 
hypothesis: that Accra’s housing market is highly constrained for lower income families, 
and has many of the symptoms of “superstar cities.”  
Section III presents a brief discussion on how the increase in housing demand, as 
would be experienced, for example, by a sharp growth in remittances or an improvement 
in access to finance, could have a strong effect on house prices. As has long been noted, 
Accra’s housing market appears to be a focal point for the investment of remittances. 
 
6 See Taylor (2006) for a review of the effects remittances can have on the demand for nontradables like 
land and the drag that this can have on productivity, p. 9.   5
                                                
However, we do not know the dimensions or scale of these flows. In Section IV, we 
conclude that an important first step is to develop this sort of empirical information, 
given the possibility of larger, economy-wide effects.   
II. Background 
As shown by Adams and Page (2003), the general source of high levels of 
remittances is the underlying strength of the economy, the credibility of the policy 
environment, and the size of the diaspora.  Such large resource flows imply a belief in the 
economy that is absent in many Sub-Saharan economies which have been experiencing 
the opposite phenomenon – capital flight of almost 4 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) per year, again see Collier et al (2004). For Ghana, such resource flows represent 
an enormous opportunity to sustain and deepen growth. However, these funds are flowing 
into an economy with a financial system which—due to many years of high inflation and 
heavy government borrowing—is only now recovering from having been among the 
more underdeveloped in Africa.
7  
In such a context, significant asset pricing problems can arise, particularly when 
the single most important investment available appears to be real estate in the capital city, 
Accra. Such investment demands undoubtedly contribute to higher real estate prices in 
the city. However, just how high the prices are is surprising. A recent ranking of the cost 
of living in the 150 most expensive cities in the world—driven in large part by real estate 
prices—placed Accra 75
th between Melbourne and Houston, cities in countries with per 
 
7 According to a commonly used measure of financial sector development, in 2004 Ghana’s financial depth 
was one-fifth the average Sub-Saharan figure, and was lower than that of countries with lower per capita 
income levels. However, significant improvements in the banking sector have been realized as shown by 
the recent performance of all banks in meeting prudential capital adequacy requirements and two-thirds of 
them exceeding these requirements by a significant margin. For more on Ghana’s financial depth, see 
Honohan and Beck (2006).   6
                                                
capita income, even on a purchasing power parity basis, more than ten times higher than 
Ghana’s.
8  
In other countries such rapid house price increases have been identified as the 
likely culprit for both the problems of housing affordability and an inability to exploit 
many of the most productive employment opportunities, besides the Gyourko et al (2006) 
study of superstar cities, see Glaeser and Gyourko (2003) and Green et al (2006) for the 
U.S., Cheshire and Sheppard (1989) for the U.K, and Malpezzi and Mayo (1997) for 
Korea and Malaysia. Williamson (1988) also provides a discussion of these effects during 
England’s Industrial Revolution as well as for developing countries generally. Moreover, 
in a country like Ghana, where one city may account for 20 percent or more of GDP, it 
would not be surprising if housing cost increases in that city alone could affect the 
country’s growth rate.
9   
Evidence on Housing Costs and Conditions in Accra.  Housing costs in some of 
Accra’s lower income neighborhoods are considerably lower than they are in Accra’s 
exclusive neighborhoods. But then, so too are the income levels. To get a sense of how 
housing conditions in Accra affect households with different income levels it is necessary 
to either make detailed surveys of conditions across the city, or to compare Accra’s low-
income housing conditions with those of similarly situated households in other cities. 
Because of data availability we choose the latter approach. This approach has the added 
 
8 The rankings are from Global Cost of Living Rankings 2006/7 by Finfacts: Business and Finance Portal. 
The per capita income comparisons are from the World Development Indicators, 2006. As for the cost of 
real estate, a recent World Bank study (2007) indicates that the rents of Class A offices in Ghana are 40 
percent higher than the average for 10 other Sub-Saharan countries, Table 9, p.48. Of course the recent 
increases in utility costs, related to the country’s energy problems, contribute to these costs. Nevertheless, 
even with adjustment for this effect the costs noted remain relatively high, as the discussion of rental 
payments in the text will show.    
9 This assumption about Accra’s share of GDP would seem to be conservative as the Greater Accra area has 
a population of almost 15 percent of the national population and incomes there are considerably higher than 
elsewhere as discussed later. Below we explore the channels through which these prices increases could 
affect growth.    7
                                                
advantage of benchmarking Accra’s experience with those of a number of other 
similarly-sized large cities in Sub-Saharan Africa. We compare the housing situation of 
inner city low-income neighborhoods in Accra with similar areas in Nairobi, Dar es 
Salaam, and Addis Ababa.
10    
As shown in Table 1, the mean and median expenditure on housing and services 
in Accra is much higher than that of similar expenditures in the other cities, yet the 
housing conditions in Accra are of lower quality and quantity. That is, while the residents 
of Accra pay much more for housing services, they get considerably less, paying, for 
example, a much higher share of the household income for some services, such as 
sanitation. Moreover, not only are costs high, the payment form is onerous. It is not 
unusual, for instance, for renters in Accra, who account for almost two-thirds of all 
households in the city, to have to make up-front payments of three years of rent, 
suggesting an extremely tight housing market.
11   
Our survey results are also consistent with more general Census findings on urban 
housing conditions in Ghana, and a large body of literature on housing conditions in the 
city. These findings indicate that urban residents in Ghana live in highly dense areas: 
average room occupancy is high at more than three persons per room, with more than 45 
percent of families living in a single room. Each plot houses several families (more than 
one-third of the plots covered in our study contain five to nine separate households) 
often—more than 40 percent of the time—living in what is termed compound housing, 
 
10 The data were gathered across the four cities between 2004 and 2006 (see Mathema, 2004, 2005, 2006a, 
2006b, 2007). In each case, the surveyed households were located in contiguous, low-income central city 
communities. The differences in the income levels of the surveyed households were similar to the 
differences in the national per capita income levels across countries, suggesting that the surveys covered 
the same general part of the income distribution. The four cities have populations from 2 to 3 million 
people, making them 4 of the 10 largest cities in Sub-Saharan Africa. The populations also tend to rely on 
similar levels of population served by basic services such as water and sanitation. Finally, the modal split in 
transportation—e.g., the share of the population using public transport, and walking—is quite similar. 
11 Gulyani (2006) shows that rent levels in Nairobi’s slums while expensive are considerably lower than 
Accra’s.    8
see Korboe (1992) for a definition and discussion of the importance of this structural 
arrangement in Ghanaian housing consumption decisions.    
This sort of housing deprivation and cost is unusual because, as shown in Table 1,  
the per capita income in Accra is considerably higher, ranging from two to almost three 
times the level of incomes in the other cities. Such higher incomes should translate into 
consumption of higher levels of housing services, but in fact, the opposite is happening. 
Indeed, for the observed result to occur—i.e., higher levels of income and lower levels of 
housing services—requires that Ghanaian families must be unable to use their higher 
incomes to access better housing as would be expected. It suggests, in other words, that 
the policy impediments in Accra must be much more severe than they are in the other 
cities.   


































































































































































































































































































































Mean  ***240 49.1 *2.5 2.7  2.8  ***4.6  *5.9  **22.1  ***5.0 7.4  Accra 
Median  186 33.8  3.0  2.0 2.0 3.0  0.2  19.7 3.9 5.8 
Mean  83 13.6  2.7  3.2 2.8 6.1  9.5  21.9  0.1  8.4  Addis Ababa, 
Nairobi,  








Difference in means statistically significant at 1 percent level 
 Difference Statistically significant at 5 percent level 
 Difference statistically significant at 10 percent level 
 
Note: Ratings of 1-5 for housing, water, and sanitation are defined in the Annex.  
 
 
One way to think about the range of policy factors that could affect supply has 
been developed by Green, Malpezzi, and Mayo (2005) based on the work of Mayer and 
Somerville (2000). They provide a clever summary equation, based on the mono-centric 
city model, that allows broad inferences to be drawn about how elastic a specific city’s   9
housing supply curve is relative to other cities, as well as how various policies and 
natural conditions—such as whether the city is bounded by a coast or not—might affect 
this elasticity.  
Equation 1 suggests that housing supply elasticity, η, is a function of: city 
population size, n, and a density factor φ. It is also affected by a discount rate, i, the city’s 
population growth rate, g, transportation costs, k, and the price of housing, P, at a fixed 
point in the city.  
  η = [2/(φ√n)] [(i-g)/k] P                (1) 
The intuition underlying this equation is that the important factors affecting 
housing supply elasticity can be broken down into components. That is, the terms in the 
first bracket on the right hand side measure the size of the city, which, in turn, determines 
the distance from the city border to its center. In the second bracket is the city’s expected 
growth rate relative to the discount rate, (i-g), divided by the cost of commuting, k. These 
factors account for how the city’s growth will affect the value of a property as well as the 
discount rate that affects the valuation of the future price increases due to city growth. 
Finally, all these factors are scaled by the price of a housing unit that is similarly situated 
in the different cities.   
One can argue about the affects and relative magnitudes of the various policies on 
relative supply elasticities, including policies possibly not included, such as land market 
restrictions or lack of property rights, or topographical conditions, such as Accra’s being 
a coastal city with a resulting inability to grow in all directions unlike Addis Ababa and 
Nairobi. Nevertheless, the results in Table 1, and particularly the much higher house 
prices, lead us to expect the elasticities for the other cities to be considerably higher than 
is the case in Accra. We examine this hypothesis by using equation 1 as a schema to consider how variations in policies would be expected to affect the housing elasticities in 
the various cities. The equation makes sure that all the important and interactive factors 
involved in an abstract model of city development are explicitly treated, and it can be 
crudely estimated with a minimum amount of aggregate data. That is, we use the equation 
to consider how basic aggregate statistics about each of the cities would affect their 
relative supply elasticities.   
To do this, we make use of the results of two recent studies of transport costs in 
African cities, see World Bank (2002) and (2005), and other city-wide level data on the 
four cities. Based on this model we can also infer how much Accra’s policies have 
affected the housing supply curve relative to the aggregate estimate. Table 2 reports on 
our estimates of the various components of equation 1 and the corresponding estimate of 
the relative housing supply elasticity in each of these cities.
12       














































































































































Addis Ababa  0.43   2,973,004   5506  0.033  21.02  1.25 
Accra  1.00   1,981,000   10708  0.034  87.77  0.43 
Nairobi  0.63    2,940,911   4300  0.036  51.16  0.94 










In a mono-centric model such as the one implied by equation (1) one important 
factor affecting the supply elasticity is that fact that Accra, unlike Nairobi and Addis 
Ababa, cannot expand in all directions. Like Dar es Salaam, and many of the U.S. 
  10
                                                 
12  The empirical implementation of equation 1 is relatively straightforward, except as regards 
transportation costs, k, and the discount rate, i. For the former, we relied on the studies noted in the text to 
compute estimates of the cost of commuting. Our approach follows that suggested by Hamilton and Mills 
(1984). As for the discount rate, because, as shown in Honohan and Beck (2006), mortgage finance is 
almost completely absent in all 4 cities, even if the other cities have somewhat more developed financial 
sectors, we assume that all borrowers face a discount rate of 25 percent.    11
                                                
superstar cities, Accra is bounded by a coast, restricting the supply of land for a given 
distance to the central city, implying that for a given population transport costs increase 
and supply elasticity declines. Thus, topography matters. However, as we show below, it 
does not dominant policy as the other coastal city, Dar es Salaam, has the highest 
estimated supply elasticity. Of far more importance are the range of development controls 
and restrictions, and property rights ambiguities that prevent land development.   
For example, problems with land administration in Ghana have long been noted, 
and could certainly be significantly improved upon, see among others Gough and 
Yankson (2000). To cite just one example, large holdings of public lands characterize 
much of Accra, reducing the supply of this already very expensive good, thereby also 
increasing k and lowering housing supply elasticity. Further, by creating minimum 
standards—of plot sizes for new housing, for example—that exceed what most people 
can afford, the regulations have, in effect, created a very high floor price on new housing, 
as well as much less dense development at the periphery, thereby placing an implicit tax 
on those who must then commute greater distances. Changing these land use regulations 
could have highly beneficial effects on both housing prices and commuting costs.  
Perhaps as important is the inflexibility in redeveloping the city’s existing stock 
of housing. Throughout the world, it is this fixed capital stock that provides most housing 
services. But in Accra this stock has rarely been recycled into taller buildings in 
correspondence with the greatly increased value of the land and expanding city 
boundaries.
13 For the most part, there are no unambiguous legal titles to much of the 
existing stock of housing; hence, it is very difficult for a private investor to step in, 
despite the high potential for profits from redevelopment of prime property in the densely 
 
13 See the discussion in The Statesman January 25, 2007 for a discussion of the situation in Accra, and 
Wheaton (1998) for an analysis of the strong effects that city size and congestion can have on inner city 
land values and the demand for high rise structures.   12
                                                
populated city core. In other words, due to property title ambiguities in the central city, 
Accra has at least one of the important characteristics of Gyourko et al’s superstar cities – 
“these markets do not allow for increasing density through construction,” p. 3. As a result 
the existing housing stock is considerably less responsive to demand and as shown by 
Angel et al (2006), Accra’s land area has been growing very rapidly, increasing k in 
equation 1 and thereby lowering elasticity.
14 
The main implication of the supply elasticities inferred from our reliance on 
equation 1 is that they indicate that Accra’s housing supply elasticity is almost one-
seventh that of Dar es Salaam’s, about a third of Addis Ababa’s, and less than half of 
Nairobi’s. But in order to judge just how elastic or inelastic these relative measures are, 
we need to have empirical evidence on the cities’ supply elasticities or at least the 
elasticity of one of the cities, estimates which are constrained by data availability. We 
can, however, follow the approach used by Malpezzi and Mayo (1997) to infer the supply 
elasticity implied by a reduced form equation 2 of housing market behavior in the four 
cities. Under this approach we first estimate a housing demand equation of the form: 
R = α0 + α1Y+ α2HH + α3HH
2 + ε    (2) 
where R is the log of rent, Y is log of income, HH is household size, and ε is an error 
term. This specification can be viewed as a traditional logarithmic owner and renter 
demand equation which closely follows the approach used by Malpezzi and Mayo (1987) 
in their review of studies of housing demand in 16 countries. The model is clearly a very 
simple one and Malpezzi and Mayo (1987) provide considerable detail on both its 
 
14 It is of course very difficult to measure the relative effectiveness of various land management institutions 
both within and between countries, as shown by Pande and Udry (2005) in their discussion of land use in a 
number of African economies. One of the advantages of the approach in equation 1 is that the factors 
included are endogenous to institutions and growth, so that judgments about the relative quality of 
institutions can be ignored.    13
weaknesses as well as its surprisingly strong performance relative to much less 
parsimonious approaches.  
Based on this model, we estimate the housing demand equations for owners and 
renters in the four cities, reported in first two equations in Table 3, i.e., equations 3.1 and 
3.2.  We also report the results from two other equations in the table, i.e., equations 3.3 
and 3.4. These latter equations are reduced form estimates that also take supply factors in 
each city into account by including dummy variables for the other cities.
15 As our earlier 
discussion indicated, we expect the policy regimes in the other cities to be relatively more 
enabling than Accra’s. Consequently, we expect the signs of the other city dummy 
variables—what might be termed supply shifting variables—to have a negative 
relationship with our dependent variable, rents.
16 In the end, our model is clearly very 
simple, but nevertheless, as described in Malpezzi and Mayo (1987), it is firmly rooted in 
traditional estimates.  
Table 3. Explaining Housing Rents and Prices 
 
Dependent variable: Log of household 




















                  
Coefficient  3.04 0.53  -0.07 0.00       
3.1  Owners 
N=49 
Adjusted R 
square=0.36  T statistic  5.72 4.97  -0.62 0.46       
                   
Coefficient  1.04 0.72  0.24  -0.01       
3.2  Renters 
N=28 
Adjusted R 
square=0.63  T statistic  1.85 6.14  1.93  -1.34       
                   
Coefficient  3.05 0.65  0.03  -0.01 -1.09 -1.12  -1.21 
3.3  Owners 
N=49 
Adjusted R 
square=0.74  T statistic  8.29 7.85  0.36  -0.65 -3.62 -5.18  -7.10 
                   
3.4  Renters  N=28 
Adjusted R 
Coefficient  2.21 0.63  0.33  -0.02 -1.14 -1.37  -1.41 
                                                 
15 See Annex 1 for definitions, descriptions, and summary statistics for all the variables in the table.  
16 We use the same definitions for rents and net imputed rents as do Malpezzi and Mayo (1987), i.e. 
household expenditure on housing and services.   14
T statistic  5.03 6.95  3.60  -3.12 -3.35 -5.53  -4.49 
 
 
For the limited number of observations which are spread out over two tenures and 
four cities, the results are remarkably robust. The explanatory power of the demand 
equations is strong, with adjusted R² in the range of 0.36 to 0.63, and the signs for all of 
the variables as expected, with almost all of the 14 coefficients in the two specifications 
significant at the 5 percent level.
17 In addition, previous work suggests a number of other 
expectations about the size of the coefficients of the various variables, which are also 
fulfilled, such as the income elasticity of housing demand in equations 3.1 and 3.2 
ranging from 0.5 to 0.7 for owners and renters, respectively.
18  
Similarly, in equations 3.3 and 3.4, the variables also have the expected signs, and 
in this case, all of the additional variables are also statistically significant. Further, the 
statistical significance of the other variables and the overall equation improve with the 
adjusted R
2 increasing to 0.86. In addition, in the latter two equations we place an 
additional expectation on the findings which is that household size should have a more 
significant affect on rent levels for renters than it does for owners; this expectation is also 
fulfilled. 
This finding warrants some explanation. We expect household size to be a larger 
consideration for renters for a number of reasons. Perhaps the main one is the adverse 
selection problem that can affect rental decisions, as described by Basu and Emerson 
(2003). According to their analysis, landlords attempt to discriminate between tenants 
based on household characteristics so as to minimize the costs of tenancy. Having more 
children is likely, one would think, to imply greater maintenance and upkeep costs for the 
                                                 
17 We report only one of the specifications. A simpler one that did not include the square of household size 
was also estimated with results similar to those reported above.  
18 The other expectations are with respect to the coefficients for household size and its squared term. In 
addition, the intercept is expected to be positive.   15
                                                
landlord, and has, according to Malpezzi and Mayo (1987), been more frequently found 
to be a significant variable in renter rather than in owner demand equations. In addition, 
Korboe (1992) suggests that in Ghana, owners are subject to cultural obligations that 
cause them to accept even distant relatives to live rent-free in their houses. Mabogunje 
(2007) makes a similar argument for other African cities, and Konadu-Agyemany (1991) 
has an interesting discussion of how these sorts of obligations affect housing choices in 
Ghana. Consistent with this result, the most recent Census data indicate that some 22 
percent of Ghanaian families do not pay any rent at all. Unlike owners, renters are under 
no such obligations. Hence, it is more likely that family size has a significant effect on 
rents paid; consistent with our findings.  
These overall results, as well as the coefficients on the dummy variables, support 
our basic hypothesis: the Accra housing market is, at least for lower income families, 
much more constrained.
19 In order to get a sense of how much less responsive, we first 
combine these estimates of income elasticity with previous empirical findings regarding 
the price elasticity of housing demand to infer an estimate of the underlying overall 
supply elasticity, as depicted by equation 4.   
η = α2/γ1+ α1        (4) 
where α2 is the income elasticity of demand as estimated in equations 3.1 and 3.2, γ1 is 
the coefficient on income in equations 3.3 and 3.4, and α1 is the assumed price elasticity 
of housing demand. Plugging in the estimates for income elasticity from our estimated 
demand equations, and an estimate of a price elasticity of -0.5, based on the literature, 
yields an overall supply elasticity estimate of about 0.3 for owners and 0.7 for renters. At 
 
19 We attempted to examine whether the dummy variables affected the slope of the supply curve rather than 
shifted it. However, our estimates were limited by the degrees of freedom. In terms of the effects on low 
income families recall from footnote 10 and the related text that our surveys are of lower income families 
in each of the cities.    16
                                                
first glance, these are highly inelastic supply curves, similar to those found by Malpezzi 
and Mayo (1997) for Malaysia and Korea’s restrictive housing markets, and considerably 
lower than even the lowest U.S. estimates found by Green et al (2006).  
However, first glances can be a bit deceiving because this elasticity figure 
represents a synthetic estimate of the overall supply elasticity for the four cities. While 
this sort of aggregation is of course impossible as the cities are by no means contiguous 
or part of the same market, the measure is, in many ways, similar to estimating a national 
housing supply curve as done, for instance, by Poterba (1991) among others.  
When this overall supply elasticity is combined with our estimates of relative 
elasticities, the results imply that Dar es Salaam’s much greater supply elasticity is indeed 
the case. It is on the order of about 1.5 to 2.0, not unlike estimates for the U.S., see Topel 
and Sherwin (1988). On the other hand, they also indicate that Accra’s housing supply 
elasticity is lower than the highly inelastic Asian results noted earlier.
20 One way to think 
about this result is that if Accra could increase its supply elasticity to the level of Dar es 
Salaam’s, the 20 percent increase in per capita income realized in Ghana over the past 
seven years would have had virtually no effect on house prices (rather than causing them 
to increase by 5 percent).
21 In other words, in Dar es Salaam’s supply-responsive market, 
this sort of increase in demand would have had no noticeable effect on house prices. 
According to this perspective, at least part of the observed increase in house prices in 
Accra is in effect a regulatory tax on housing supply which redistributes wealth from 
largely poorer renters to the owners of real estate. While the estimated welfare losses 
 
20 The elasticity measure for Dar es Salaam comes from multiplying the overall aggregate elasticity 
measure that we estimated with equation 2 by the city’s relative measure, i.e., the results in Table 2, or 
0.7*2.8=2.  
21 The price increase is estimated by using the income increase since 2000 and the elasticity estimates for 
price, income and supply elasticity used in equation 4. We then differentiated house prices with respect to 
income.    17
                                                
associated with such a tax on the residential real estate component would not be great, on 
the order of 0.4 percent of GDP, they would still be more than double the size of the 
city’s budget.
22   
In addition, this regulatory tax almost certainly reduces productivity by slowing 
the ability to migrate to more productive jobs in the city. This result seems likely for two 
reasons. First, as shown by Brueckner (1990) among others, the gap between urban and 
rural incomes is one of the fundamental determinants of urban growth. In Ghana, this gap 
is not only very large, more than 60 percent, it has also been increasing over time. So too 
is the income gap between households in Accra and other cities, which is 20 percent.
23  
Moreover, Aryeetey et. al. (2004) show that at the same time that the income gap 
has been growing, urban growth has been slowing to a surprisingly low level, more than 
30 percent lower than that of more urbanized neighboring countries, and more than 35 
percent lower than the rate in two of our comparator cities.
24 At Ghana’s somewhat lower 
level of urbanization, as shown by Williamson (1988) and Brueckner (1990), the opposite 
would be expected, even more so since the income differential between cities and the 
countryside has been increasing. That is, one would expect that urban growth should be 
 
22 This calculation assumes that Accra accounts for about 20 percent of Ghana’s GDP and that Ghana 
follows typical patterns of wealth holdings to GDP ratios of about 1.7 times as much housing/wealth as 
GDP, see Goldsmith (1984). It ignores the other fixed capital stock in the city which also confronts this 
regulatory tax. In this case, the 5 percent transfer to residential real estate property owners embodied in the 
price increase would be equal to 5 percent of 1.7*GDP*0.2, where the last term stands for Accra’s share of 
GDP, or all together, about 1.7 percent of GDP. Applying the crude deadweight loss formula, 1/2η, where 
T is the tax rate, and using the previously assumed price elasticity would result in a loss of about one 
quarter of that amount, about 0.4 percent of GDP. Because Ghana’s GDP is approximately $6 billion, this 
translates into a $24 million deadweight loss. The 2004 budget for the city of Accra was $10 million.  
23 Of course some significant but unknown share of these higher nominal incomes are offset by higher 
living costs, and particularly higher housing costs. Nevertheless, it is instructive to compare it to similar 
gaps in other times and places. Williamson (1988), for example, reports that the urban-rural wage gap for 
unskilled relatively homogeneous male workers in England during the Industrial Revolution was about 33 
percent. Squire (1981) estimates a similar figure for developing countries at over 40 percent.  
24 Ghana’s urban growth rate is 30 percent lower than Senegal’s, Cote d’Ivoire’s, Cameroon, and Nigeria’s. 
On the growth rate for the other comparator cities see Table 3. Ghana’s urban growth rate between 1990-
2003 was one-third lower than that of the average of the 24 Sub-Saharan African countries considered by 
Kessides (2006) even though its share of urban population is close to the average figure.     18
                                                
higher than that of countries which are already more urbanized, which is clearly not the 
case. This slowing of the urbanization process can lead to significant reductions in 
productivity and in costly misallocation of resources.
25 Williamson (1986), for instance, 
shows that the deadweight losses implied by the misallocation of resources in nineteenth 
century England with its much smaller gap may have exceeded 3 percent of GDP. 
 
III.  Housing Demand Increases and Housing Prices 
  Cumulatively, then, Accra’s supply elasticity is much lower than the comparator 
cities. Its elasticity is perhaps even lower than the highly restricted markets Malpezzi and 
Mayo (2001) documented in Korea and Malaysia 15 years ago. Based on this result we 
find support for the argument raised at the outset that an increase in housing demand, as 
would be experienced, for example, by a sharp growth in remittances or an improvement 
in access to finance, could have a strong effect on house prices. Can we say anything 
more than this? Do we, in fact, find that housing market regulations and land 
administration policies in Accra create the sorts of price pressures on non-tradables that 
Taylor (2006) suggests may be a drag on productivity? While data limitations prevent an 
unambiguous answer to this question, we can use the basic model to at least provide a 
qualified perspective on how much remittances might have mattered for resource 
allocation and distributional questions.  
For example, as a thought experiment, consider the effects that further 
improvements in the provision of housing finance could have on the Accra real estate 
market. One way of thinking about the effects of this sort of changed economic 
environment in terms of equation 1 would be to differentiate η with respect to i, showing 
 
25 The increase in urban unemployment would seem to contradict this argument. However, in a city with so 
much informal sector activity this variable is extremely difficult to measure with any accuracy.   19
that dη/di < 0, and inferring by how much the improvement in access to finance would 
affect, in the first instance, housing demand, and in the second, the supply elasticity of 
housing.  
Similarly, if remittances are anything like the level they appear to be, then they 
would have an effect on both housing demand and supply elasticity like that of lowering 
financing costs. Such effects would certainly help create more housing and importantly, 
related jobs. At the same time, however, they would also contribute to significant house 
price increases, and in so doing, almost certainly contribute to slower migration into the 
city.  
While much more detailed empirical analysis is needed, our results suggest that 
Accra’s housing market has many of the symptoms of “superstar cities.” It certainly has 
an inelastic housing supply and topographical restrictions on how it can develop; it also 
seems to be experiencing an inflow of higher income families—from the diaspora—who 
appear to find other Ghanaian cities less than perfect substitutes for Accra; and finally, it 
has very high house prices. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that Accra is 
suffering many of the problems that affect superstar cities.  
IV. Conclusions 
  As has long been noted, Accra’s housing market appears to be a focal point for 
the investment of remittances. However, we do not know the dimensions or scale of these 
flows. Hence, an important first step is to develop this sort of information. Nevertheless, 
even without it, our results point to a policy regime that could weaken Ghana’s ability to 
achieve the higher, more equitable rates of growth pointed to by Vision 2020 and the   20
rthur 
                                                
Noguchi Statement.
26 If a very inelastic housing supply is constraining the positive 
effects of possible rural-urban migration on growth, as appears to be the case, then A
Lewis’s concern with the high cost of urbanization may well be constraining growth. In 
other words, the price effects of policy-induced reductions in supply elasticity can have 
significant effects on resource allocation and income distribution.  
Further, the policy-constrained housing market may also contribute to 
expectations of further capital gains on housing investments in Accra that could divert 
private investment to housing rather than other sectors that could, for instance, help 
increase Ghana’s manufacturing base. Finally, by increasing the housing costs of the 
poor, they also limit the ability of these investments to further the large gains in poverty 
reduction that have been realized in Accra. Certainly, the possibility of larger, economy-
wide effects warrants more detailed empirical analysis of these effects.   
 
26 The first is a statement by the Government of Ghana on its economic vision for Ghana, calling for 
policies that will allow it to break into higher levels of growth with a “Golden Age for Business” 
perspective. The latter is a statement by a group of 40 Ghanaian economists who met in 2001 to discuss 
how Ghana might achieve macro stability, growth and poverty reduction. See Aryeetey and Kanbur (2004).   21
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Table A1. Rating of Housing and Services 
and Summary Statistics 
 
 
House condition (physical structure) 
1. Very poor  Unlivable - Needs to be demolished and rebuilt 
2. Poor     Temporary construction, structurally deficient, needs major improvements. 
3. Needs improvement  Structurally deficient/ mixed const. materials (kuccha/ pukka), but improvable on-site 
4. Fair     Predominantly perm. construction; needs minor improvements  
5. Good     Permanent construction (indoor kitchen and toilet); no need for improvements. 
     
Plot condition (accessibility) 
1. Very poor  Located in a hazard zone/ not upgradable (needs resettlement) 
2. Poor     Only pedestrian access (no emergency access) 
3. Needs improvement  Off the road, but has emergency access 
4. Fair     On a secondary or tertiary unpaved road 
5. Good     Has vehicular access (paved road) 
     
Water Access Rating  
1. Very poor  No piped water source (only well, river, spring etc) 
2. Poor     Purchased from vendor or neighbors 
3. Needs improvement  Shared or community standpipe 
4. Fair     Own connection + purchase (due to poor water supply) 
5. Good     Own connection (on plot-- indoor or outdoor) 
     
Sanitation Rating (Toilet) 
1. Very poor  None (use bush, beach etc.) 
2. Poor     Public toilet with exp.>4% of income OR 
    "Semi-flush"/unhygienic  pit latrine shared by >10 HHs 
3. Needs improvement  Hygienic pit on plot, shared by <10 HHs 
4. Fair     Public toilet with exp.<4% of income  
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Table A2. Summary Statistics (from household survey data) 
 
Country City 
Income per capita (USD 
PPP) 
Ethiopia  Addis  overall  mean  50 
      median  35 
    renters  mean  54 
      median  32 
    owners  mean  34 
      median  46 
Ghana  Accra  overall  mean  240 
      median  186 
    renters  mean  308 
      median  201 
    owners  mean  217 
      median  172 
Kenya  Nairobi  overall  mean  107 
      median  45 
    renters  mean  69 
      median  37 
    owners  mean  153 
      median  46 
Tanzania  Dar  overall  mean  77 
     median  61 
   renters  mean  164 
     median  176 
   owners  mean  57 
     median  49 
 
  
 